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ESSAY
A Burkean Perspective on Patent
Eligibility, Part II: Reflections on the
(Counter) Revolution in Patent Law
Thomas F. Cotter*
In 2007, I published an essay in the Berkeley Technology
Law Journal, titled A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility,
in which I discussed how the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office had discarded various doctrines relating to
patent eligibility—among them, rules that all patentable
inventions must pertain to the technological arts, that they
may not read on mental steps, and that patentable processes
must effect a physical transformation—in favor of an approach
that asked only whether an invention had practical utility and
was predictable in its effects. Taking a cue from the (admittedly
non-patent related) writings of the Anglo-Irish statesmen and
political theorist Edmund Burke, I argued that some aspects of
the older approach to patentable subject matter may have
embodied an underappreciated wisdom, to the extent these
older doctrines prevented patent law from intruding upon both
laws of nature and human liberty interests, including freedom
of speech and personal autonomy. At the same time, I
© 2010 Thomas F. Cotter.
* Thomas F. Cotter is a Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. He thanks Professors Miriam Bitton and Gideon
Parchomovsky, organizers of the First Annual Sanford R. Colb Intellectual
Property Law Conference held at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel,
January 34, 2010, for inviting me to present this essay; and conference
participants for comments and criticism. Any errors that remain are mine.
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recognized that, as times change, the law too must change, and
I contended that it would be inadvisable to exclude computer
and business-related art from the scope of patentable subject
matter altogether. I nevertheless argued that, properly
reformed and refined, the older doctrines could still play a
useful role in preventing patent law from unduly extending its
reach into every nook and cranny of human endeavor.
Three years later, as we await the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the legal landscape
appears to have changed substantially. From a time just prior
to the publication of my Burkean paper and continuing to the
present day, the Court has actively scaled back some of the
Federal Circuit’s more expansive readings of patent doctrine in
cases such as eBay Inc., MedImmune, KSR, Microsoft, and
Quanta. Both the Federal Circuit and the Patent Office have
applied more restrictive standards for patent eligibility as well,
and the Supreme Court may go farther yet. Perhaps the greater
risk now is that courts and other policymakers will settle on a
formalistic approach that blindly adheres to the form of
traditional doctrines while ignoring those doctrines’ underlying
rationales. I will argue that a workable standard for patent
eligibility should reflect the wisdom embodied in tradition,
while being flexible enough to accommodate advances in
relatively new useful arts such as information technology and
biotechnology. In particular, I will argue that three screens
derived from traditional patent doctrine—a “technological arts”
screen, a “minimal physicality” screen, and a “noninvasiveness”
screen, as I will define them—should suffice to ensure that
patent law continues to encourage technological progress,
without precluding access to the public domain building blocks
from which such progress arises.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just a few years ago, it appeared to most observers that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit1 and
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had
discarded several limiting doctrines relating to patent
eligibility—including the technological arts doctrine, the
mental steps doctrine, and the requirement that patentable
1. Since 1982, the Federal Circuit is the court that hears (almost) all
appeals in patent infringement litigation in the United States.
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processes effect a physical transformation—in favor of an
approach that asked only whether an invention had practical
utility and was predictable in its effects.2 In a paper I wrote in
2006 and published in 2007, I argued that some aspects of
these discarded doctrines nevertheless may have reflected an
underappreciated wisdom insofar as they helped to prevent
patent law from privatizing laws of nature and other naturally
occurring phenomena, and from unduly encroaching upon
important human liberty and autonomy interests.3 At the same
time, I argued, as times change, the law too must change; in
particular, I expressed doubt that altogether excluding
computer and business-related art from the scope of patentable
subject matter would be advisable.4 Nevertheless, I concluded
that, properly reformed and refined, the older doctrines
referenced above could still play a useful role in preventing
patent law from potentially extending into every nook and
cranny of human behavior.5
2. For an overview of these developments, see Thomas F. Cotter, A
Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 859–
74 (2007). See generally State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a system that
involved the transformation of data by a machine constituted patentable
subject matter, because it was a “practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produce[d] a ‘useful, concrete,
and tangible result’”; and laying to rest the exclusion of business methods from
the scope of patent eligibility), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that a process that did not involve a physical transformation of
matter was patentable because it produced “a tangible, useful, result”),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943; Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1385, 1385–86 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per curiam) (rejecting the technological
arts doctrine); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING AND
PROCEDURE § 2106, at 2100-11 (8th ed., rev. Aug. 2006) (conforming with
Lundgren, and not imposing a technological arts requirement). At present,
patent examiners are advised to continue following the guidelines as set forth
in Manual of Patent Examining and Procedure § 2106 (8th ed., rev. July 2008),
with certain modifications in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953–54, 957. See Memorandum from John J. Love, Deputy
Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Tech. Ctr. Dirs., Patent
Examining
Corps
(Jan.
7,
2009),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/bilski_guidance_memo.pdf.
3. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 879–95.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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In the four years since I authored that earlier paper, the
legal landscape has changed dramatically. In a much-discussed
series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has scaled
back some of the Federal Circuit’s more expansive readings of
patent doctrine.6 In addition, both the Federal Circuit and the
USPTO have applied more restrictive standards for patent
eligibility, as evidenced in cases including (most famously) In re
Bilski7 as well as some administrative decisions from the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences.8 As of this writing,
6. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119
(2008) (holding that patent exhaustion is triggered by the sale of products the
“only reasonable and intended use” of which is “to practice the patent” and
which embody “essential features” of the patented invention); Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007) (holding that Patent Act § 271(f)
did not apply, where defendant sent “computer software . . . from the United
States to a foreign manufacturer on a master disk, or by electronic
transmission,” and the foreign recipient then engaged in conduct that, had it
occurred within the United States, would have infringed the U.S. patent); KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (rejecting the “rigid and
mandatory” application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test for
determining nonobviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 137 (2007) (holding that a patent licensee is “not required . . . to break or
terminate its . . . license . . . before seeking a declaratory judgment . . . that the
underlying patent was invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed”); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s rule that the prevailing plaintiff in a patent infringement action was
automatically entitled to permanent injunctive relief absent exceptional
circumstances, and holding that the propriety of injunctive relief is a matter
for a court to determine in accordance with “traditional equitable principles”).
7. 545 F.3d at 953–57 (holding that “[a] claimed process is surely patenteligible . . . if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing”; that patentable
methods do not preempt all practical uses of a fundamental principle; and that
“the recited machine or transformation must not constitute mere ‘insignificant
postsolution activity’”). See also In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (holding that claimed method failed the machine-or-transformation
test); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 980–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (similar); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19,
2008) (affirming judgment that method of treatment claims constituted
nonpatentable subject matter); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that signals are not patentable subject matter). But see
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that methods of treatment constituted patentable
subject matter, because they “‘transform[ed] an article into a different state or
thing,’ and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of the claimed
process’”), pet’n for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2009) (No. 09490).
8. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Dickerson, Appeal 2009-001172, at 16
(B.P.A.I.
July
9,
2009),
available
at
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd2009001172-07-
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however, the ultimate resolution of the patent eligibility debate
remains uncertain while the Bilski case remains pending before
the United States Supreme Court.9 With respect to patentable
subject matter in particular, the risk now is that courts and
other policymakers will settle on formalistic approaches which
blindly adhere to the form of traditional doctrines while
ignoring those doctrines’ underlying rationales. As I have
contended previously, patent eligibility should reflect the
wisdom embodied in tradition while being flexible enough to
accommodate
advances
in
information
technology,
biotechnology, and other emerging fields.10
In this brief Essay, I will argue that three overlapping
criteria or screens should suffice to ensure that patent law
continues to encourage technological progress without
precluding access to the public domain building blocks from
which such progress arises. Part II restates the framework I
proposed in my 2006 article. Part III briefly recounts the
“counterrevolution” in patent law as initiated by the Supreme
Court during the intervening years. Part IV sets forth my
proposed three screens; Part V concludes by discussing their
application to some current issues, and some potential
09-2009-1 (holding that claims including “a step of outputting information
from a computer” were tied to a particular machine), with Ex parte CorneaHasegan, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1557, 1560 (B.P.A.I. 2009) (holding that
recitation of a series of steps to be performed on a processor did not recite
patentable subject matter, because not tied to a particular machine); Ex parte
Halligan, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1355, 1364–65 (B.P.A.I. 2008) (similar); Ex
parte Langemyr, 89 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1988, 1996–98 (B.P.A.I. 2008) (holding,
in an informative opinion, that a method executed in a computer apparatus
was not patentable subject matter, because it was not tied to a “particular
machine”); Ex parte Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1826, 1833–35 (B.P.A.I.
2008) (informative opinion similar to Langemyr, but also holding that a
combination of two computing devices operating together was a particular
apparatus). See also, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F.
Supp. 2d 1068, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a method for detecting
fraud over the Internet was not patentable subject matter). Opinions differ
also as to whether Beauregard claims (software on a disk) remain patentable
post-Bilski. Compare Ex parte Li, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1695, 1698–99
(B.P.A.I. 2008) (holding that they are), with Cybersource, 620 F. Supp. 2d at
1078–81 (holding that the Bilski analysis applies to such claims, and that the
claims at issue were not patentable subject matter); Cornea-Hasegan, 89
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1561–62 (similar to Cybersource).
9. The Court heard oral argument on November 9, 2009. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Nov. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08964.pdf.
10. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 878–79.
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counterarguments.
II. BURKE AND PATENTS: THE PERSPECTIVE AS OF 2006
To put my argument in context, my 2006 paper attempted
to ground the patent eligibility debate in the political thought
of the Anglo-Irish statesman and political philosopher Edmund
Burke.11 To be sure, Burke himself left few if any clues
regarding his views on the patent system. My argument
therefore drew on two more general, and related, aspects of
Burkean thought as reflected in Burke’s landmark work
Reflections on the Revolution in France.12 The first, more widely
noted, strand emphasizes the role of tradition and custom as
embodying practices that incorporate the collective insights of
many people and that have proven successful over time: in
short, the notion that the many are, in some meaningful sense,
smarter than the few.13 A second aspect, however, recognizes
that tradition and custom are not sacrosanct.14 Some
traditions, after all—slavery and the subjugation of women,
among others—are repellent.15 Moreover, as Cass Sunstein has
noted, Burkeanism fails when custom is based on collective
action (or other related) problems and thus fails to embody
latent wisdom.16 Indeed, Burke himself famously recognized
that change is sometimes both necessary and inevitable.17
Nevertheless, I argued, a Burkean-inspired approach (to
matters generally, or to patent law in particular) would tend to
prefer gradual or incremental change whenever possible; would
be wary of the unintended consequences of radical reform; and
would be receptive to the possibility that tradition may embody
practical wisdom that, in the words of the twentieth century
Burkean Michael Oakeshott, cannot be reduced to mere
technique.18
Applying this framework to the patent eligibility debate as
11. See generally Cotter, supra note 2.
12. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790).
13. See id. at 74; Cotter, supra note 2, at 856–57.
14. See BURKE, supra note 12, at 19; Cotter, supra note 2, at 857.
15. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 857.
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353,
371 (2006).
17. See BURKE, supra note 12, at 51–52, 133, 143.
18. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 878 (citing MICHAEL OAKESHOTT,
RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 26 (1991)).
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it existed in 2006, I argued that some of the then-disfavored
eligibility doctrines may have embodied a measure of
underappreciated wisdom. Focusing on three doctrines in
particular (technological arts, mental steps, and physical
transformation), I attempted both to distill the rationales that
underlay these doctrines and to reformulate them in a manner
that would preserve that kernel of wisdom without unduly
interfering with the ability of the patent system to promote the
progress of the useful arts.19 Properly reformulated, I argued,
these doctrines would serve the purpose of ensuring that laws
of nature and other naturally occurring phenomena would
remain in the public domain; of serving as a backup when other
doctrines fail to attain this goal; and of ensuring that the
patent system avoid intruding into the domains of human
thought processes and other protected areas of human liberty
and autonomy.20 At the same time, I argued, there may no good
reason to exclude software and business-related art from the
domain of patents altogether; times do indeed change.21
Properly revised, I concluded, the three above-mentioned
doctrines would introduce modest but non-negligible restraints
on what I perceived to be an ever-expanding patent system.22
III. REFLECTIONS ON THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
In many respects the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence from
the past four years has (in my view) provided a necessary
corrective to that ever-expanding system. In eBay, the Court
laid to rest the Federal Circuit rule under which the prevailing
patent owner was almost automatically entitled to injunctive
relief.23 In KSR, the Court rejected the “rigid” application of the
19. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 884–95.
20. See id. On the human liberty and autonomy point, my argument was
greatly influenced by scholars such as Kevin Collins, Alan Durham, and Jay
Thomas. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV.
317 (2007) [hereinafter Collins, Propertizing Thought]; Kevin Emerson Collins,
Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of Insufficient
Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759; Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the
Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419; John R. Thomas, Liberty and
Property in Patent law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas,
Liberty and Property]; John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberal
Professions].
21. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 883–84.
22. See id. at 884–95.
23. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
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Federal Circuit’s teaching-suggestion-motivation test as the
overriding criterion for evaluating nonobviousness,24 and in
Microsoft v. AT & T the Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s
expansive interpretation of Patent Act § 271(f).25 In other cases,
the Court made it easier for patent licensees to challenge
patent validity,26 and reaffirmed the vitality of the first-sale
doctrine.27 These decisions may be open to criticism in various
respects, but at least in a rough sense the Court appears to
have made a positive contribution by nudging patent doctrine
away from some of the dysfunctional aspects that critics had
flagged in recent years.28
But just as Burke counseled against an unthinking
adherence to custom and tradition, we should be wary about
indulging an unthinking nostalgia for pre-Federal Circuit
patent doctrine. Confining my remarks to patent eligibility, my
own view is that the Federal Circuit’s machine-ortransformation standard as announced in Bilski29 is probably
an improvement over State Street Bank.30 Applied woodenly,

24. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
25. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–42 (2007).
26. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
27. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119
(2008).
28. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008);
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds. 2004).
29. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953–54 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (“A claimed process is
surely patent-eligible . . . if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus,
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing”; that
patentable methods do not preempt all practical uses of a fundamental
principle; and that “the recited machine or transformation must not constitute
mere ‘insignificant post solution activity.’”).
30. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a system that involved the
transformation of data by a machine constituted patentable subject matter,
because it was a “practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula,
or calculation, because it produce[d] a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’”;
and laying to rest the exclusion of business methods from the scope of patent
eligibility), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
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however, the Bilski standard potentially produces some
dubious results. Does it make sense, for example, not to
characterize a general purpose computer as equivalent to a
“particular machine,” while two such computers linked together
are?31 Is the Bilski standard a good fit for diagnostic and
therapeutic method patents?32 More generally, does Bilski
really address the core concerns that once underlay the mental
steps and technological arts doctrines, or does it merely sweep
those concerns under the rug? Drawing on my 2006 paper and
on insights from other scholars (as well as some of the amicus
briefs that have been filed in connection with the Bilski
litigation), I present below three screens that I believe would
embody the essential wisdom of the past while remaining
flexible enough to meet new technological challenges.
IV. THREE SCREENS
A. TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS
As the first of my proposed three screens, I suggest that
courts seriously consider reintroducing some version of the
technological arts doctrine. As I noted in 2006, case law and
USPTO guidelines were, until relatively recently, uniform in
stating that such a doctrine existed.33 Some, though not all,
scholars equate the “technological arts” with the “useful arts”
mentioned in article I of the Constitution,34 and a technological
arts doctrine is common to other patent systems.35 That said,
31. See Ex parte Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1826, 1833–34
(B.P.A.I. 2008) (concluding that a combination of two computing devices
operating together was a particular apparatus).
32. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
129, 134–38 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Claim 13 of plaintiff’s
patent, which recited a method comprising (1) testing a blood or tissue sample
for the presence of an elevated level of homocysteine, and (2) correlating an
elevated level with a folate or cobalamin deficiency, did not constitute
patentable subject matter); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), pet’n for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W.
3254 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2009) (No. 09-490); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen Idec, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008).
33. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 862, 868–69.
34. See id. at 875 n.112 (citing sources for and against this proposition).
35. See id. at 885 n.154 (noting the presence of such a requirement within
the European Patent Office); Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does
Technology Really Matter in Patent Law? A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines
of Appropriate Patentable Subject Matter in American and European Patent
Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 63 (2008) (discussing technological arts doctrines in
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the U.S. case law and commentary was never entirely clear
about exactly what the technological arts doctrine meant, and
depending on how it is phrased the doctrine can carry different
meanings. Be that as it may, my proposal is that, to be patent
eligible, the claimed invention must in some meaningful sense
(1) harness the forces of nature (2) in some stable, predictable,
and reproducible manner36 (3) to achieve a practical end result.
So construed, the doctrine would preclude, among other things,
attempts to patent laws of nature and other naturally occurring
phenomena; abstract ideas; and aesthetic creations. To this
end, the doctrine would help to buttress other standard patent
law doctrines, including utility, inherency, nonobviousness,
claim definiteness, and enablement.37 As I have argued before,
some degree of redundancy or doctrinal overlap may actually be
a virtue, insofar as it increases one’s confidence that the rules
at issue are serving legitimate purposes, and serves as
insurance that, should courts or other policymakers fail in
correctly applying one doctrine another may serve as a backup
to attain the correct result.38 In addition, the doctrine as
formulated above would help to clarify the boundaries between
patent and copyright, which otherwise increasingly risk
becoming blurred.39 Finally, a technological arts doctrine of the
type I propose here would ensure that the patent system
remains off-limits to inventions the practice of which requires
no physical structure of any sort. As such, this screen would
serve as a backup for screens two and three below, both of
which are intended to prevent the patent system from invading
important liberty and autonomy interests. To the extent an
inventor could easily add a technological “step” to an otherwise
nontechnological invention, however, this screen would leave
intact a robust patent incentive. It would only screen out claims
different European nations); Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College
of Law Intellectual Property Institute in Support of Respondent at 22–24,
Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Oct. 2, 2009) (noting presence of a similar
requirement in Japanese and German law).
36. This requirement is inspired by Yahoo!’s amicus brief in Bilski. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo!, Inc. in Support of Neither Party at 4, Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) (arguing that patentable processes must be
“stable, predictable, and reproducible—i.e., . . . ‘machine-like’”).
37. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 882–84.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Andrew F. Knight, A Potentially New IP: Storyline Patents,
86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859 (2004) (arguing in favor of patenting
storylines).
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that are drafted so broadly (such as Bilski’s)40 as to require no
physical instantiation whatsoever and—at the other end of the
spectrum—inventions that are likely to have little if any social
value, such as a method for proposing marriage.41 At the same
time, requiring the drafter to add that technological step would
not be an exercise in mere formalism; it would help to ensure
that patent law neither preempts all practical applications of
fundamental principles42 nor unduly siphons off social
resources to trivia.
B. MINIMAL PHYSICALITY
My second proposed screen would require that a claimed
method reflect at least some minimal degree of physicality. In
this respect, I would modify the Bilski standard and draw upon
the dissenting opinion in Ex parte Lundgren43 to require that a
method either (1) effect a physical transformation, external to
the human actor, of matter or energy from one state to another,
or (2) be tied to some tangible thing (but not necessarily a
“particular machine”). In addition, drawing on the work of
Professor Kevin Collins,44 I would require that a method
40. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (noting that Claim 1
did not require the use of “any specific machine or apparatus”).
41. See U.S. Patent App. No. 20070078663 (filed Mar. 3, 2003), available
at
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsear
chbool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=20070078663.PGNR.&OS
=DN/20070078663&RS=DN/20070078663. According to one source, this
application was subsequently abandoned. See Comments to Posting of Orin
Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1207635554.shtml
(Apr. 8, 2008, 2:19 AM). A technological arts doctrine could be more stringent,
of course, than what I propose above. In Part IV, I discuss some of the
advantages and disadvantages of a stricter standard.
42. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 953 (explaining that Supreme Court case law
allows patents for particular applications of fundamental principles).
43. 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1399 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (Barrett, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. See Collins, Propertizing Thought, supra note 20, at 331; see also Brief
of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins in Support of Neither
Party at 12–13, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Collins
Amicus Brief]; Posting of Kevin Emerson Collins to Patently-O, An Initial
Comment
on
Prometheus:
The
Irrelevance
of
Intangibility,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/09/an-initial-comment-on-prometheusthe-irrelevance-of-intangibility-1.html (Sept. 17, 2009, 5:42 PM) [hereinafter
Collins, Initial Comment].
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contain at least one step that both (1) distinguishes the method
from the prior art and (2) cannot be performed mentally. The
intuition here is twofold. First, a patentable invention should
have some effect on or relation of the external physical world. A
common problem with many method patents in recent years is
the level of abstraction with which they are drafted; the
resulting fuzziness in the scope of the property right, in turn,
reduces the social utility of the patent system as a tool for
inducing innovation.45 Some connection with the physical
world, as Professors Bohannan and Hovenkamp have noted,
reduces the social costs of unduly abstract patent claims.46
Second, the second part of the test ensures that it cannot be an
act of even “technical” patent infringement to think patentable
thoughts.47 In these respects, the minimal physicality screen
helps to ensure that abstract ideas, human cognition, and (once
again) laws of nature and other naturally occurring phenomena
remain in the public domain. At the same time, as phrased
above the criterion would accommodate the patentability of
diagnostic and therapeutic methods like the ones at issue in
Laboratory Corp. of American and Prometheus v. Mayo as long
as those claims contain a third, physical step (in addition to
what Collins refers to as the “determine” and “infer” steps)48
that distinguishes them from the prior art.49
45. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 28, at 194–212.
46. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust:
Reformation and Harm 40, 47–48 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377382.
47. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 893 & n.191. I have argued before that,
even if it is unlikely that any patent owner would actually file suit against
someone for thinking patentable thoughts, the wisdom of a system that
renders such private (and sometimes involuntary) conduct even technically
infringing is difficult to grasp. I suggest below that the inclusion of a third,
nonmental step to “determine and infer” claims should provide an adequate
incentive to engage in socially useful invention without the absurdity of
rendering persons even technically liable based on the content of their brains.
Moreover, while one might argue that my proposed approach introduces a
measure of formalism into patent drafting, my response is that the distinction
between a “determine and infer” claim and a claim involving a third
nonmental step is not merely a matter of form, but rather works (1) to
preserve the dignitary interest in preventing patent claims from reading on
human thought processes and (2) to keep the naturally occurring correlation
between some physical phenomenon and a human condition within the public
domain.
48. Collins, Initial Comment, supra note 44.
49. See id. According to some of the Bilski amicus briefs, the ability to
patent such methods provides an important incentive for investment in so-
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C. NONINVASIVENESS
Under my third proposed screen, and perhaps most
controversially, an invention would not be patent eligible if its
enforcement would unduly interfere with fundamental liberty
interests or with the domain of copyright law. Inspired here
principally by the work of Jay Thomas50 I suggest that a screen
of this type would prevent the state, through the
intermediation of the patent system, from intruding upon (for
example) the provision of advice that otherwise would be
privileged by reason of doctor-patient, attorney-client, or priestpenitent relationships.51 In addition, the introduction of this
screen would (like the technological arts screen) help to prevent
patent law from encroaching upon copyright by precluding the
patenting of subject matter such as books, music, motion
pictures, and story lines. Moreover, by operating at a
subconstitutional level, this screen would enable courts to avoid
having to decide difficult questions such as whether the
issuance and enforcement of patents falling into these
categories intrudes upon constitutionally protected speech or
privacy interests.52
V. CONCLUSION: SOME APPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE
DRAWBACKS
Many applications of my three proposed screens should be
relatively straightforward. As noted above, the physicality
screen would exclude “determine and infer” claims such as
Metabolite’s claim 13 (but it would not exclude a hypothetical
alternative claim that included a third, nonmental step that
distinguished the invention from the prior art).53 Similarly,
called personalized medicine. See, e.g., Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24–25, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964
(Aug. 6, 2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae Medtronic, Inc. in Support of Neither
Party at 10–12, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009). Absent evidence to
the contrary, however, it seems unlikely that requiring the addition of a third,
nonmental step would greatly weaken the patent incentive; and it would
preserve the dignitary and public domain interests that I identified above.
50. See Thomas, Liberty and Property, supra note 20; Thomas, Liberal
Professions, supra note 20.
51. Imagine, for example, a claim to a method for hearing a penitent’s
confession.
52. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 881–82 (citing Thomas, Liberty and
Property, supra note 20, at 609).
53. See supra notes 47–49.

COTTER LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

378

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:09 AM

[Vol. 11:1

claims such as those at issue in Bilski, Comiskey, and
Ferguson,54 all of which would read on purely intangible
processes, would be excluded under the physicality screen as
well as, most likely, by the technological arts criterion.55
Patents claiming legal methods (including the tax planning
patents that many observers find offensive,56 as well as others
such as the method for selecting a jury57) would be excluded by
the noninvasiveness criterion (and possibly by the first two
screens in addition). Other types of intangible methods, such as
the aforementioned application for a patent for a method for
proposing marriage, would be excluded by the technological
arts screen and possibly by the other two as well.
The vast majority of claimed inventions, on the other hand,
would still be patent eligible under my criteria. The physicality
screen as defined above would permit many business and
software-related methods to be patented, as long as (for
example) they are tied to a machine or apparatus (such as a
general purpose computer). Genes and other naturally
occurring substances that are refined and isolated from their
natural state, and that can be put to some practical human
purpose, would still be patent eligible, as would (as noted)
diagnostic and therapeutic methods the point of novelty of
which is a nonmental step.
To be sure, the relative modesty of my three proposed
screens will appear to some observers as a drawback. Many
people (though not I) still decry the patentability of genes,
human created life forms, and other products of
biotechnology.58 On somewhat firmer ground, in my view, are
54. See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that
claimed method failed the machine-or-transformation test); In re Comiskey,
554 F.3d 967, 980–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009).
55. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Yahoo!, Inc., supra note 36, at 4.
56. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 35, United States Code, to Limit
Damages and Other Remedies with Respect to Patents for Tax Planning
Methods,
H.R.
2365,
110th
Cong.
(2007),
available
at
http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/5A89F6D0-7757-4135-8B788AB8433C94E8/0/Tax_Planning_Method_Patents.pdf; Wade M. Chumney et
al., Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of TaxRelated and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 343, 343–47 (2009)
(introducing an argument for reducing the scope of tax-planning patents).
57. See U.S. Patent No. 6,607,389 (filed Dec. 3, 2001).
58. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off.,
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those who argue that (notwithstanding some possible
counterexamples) the extension of patent eligibility to software
and business methods has produced, on net, far greater social
costs than benefits.59 My response to this critique, however, is
to note that patent eligibility is a crude filter for carrying out
social policy. Once we move beyond the narrow functions I have
articulated above—of keeping laws of nature and other natural
phenomena within the public domain, or preserving important
human liberty and autonomy interests, and of maintaining
some boundary between the domains of patent and copyright
law—any consensus is much harder to maintain and is, in my
view, a matter better addressed either by other patent law
doctrines or, if necessary, by legislative action. An important
consideration here is that, even if under current circumstances
the social costs of business and software-related patents
outweigh the benefits, that mix of costs and benefits may vary
over time, as well as from one industry to another. Rather than
excluding such subject matter from the scope of patent
protection altogether, a rational patent system might strive to
constrain the potential social costs through judicious
applications of such proxies as nonobviousness, claim
definiteness, and enablement doctrine. In this sense, patent
eligibility exclusions should be reserved for the relatively “easy”
cases.
Other possible critiques of my approach may evince
differing reactions. Some observers may argue that the term
“technology” or “technological arts” cannot be adequately
defined, or that any proposed definition is so broad as to
exclude relatively little, if anything.60 To the extent these
__F. Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 3614434, at *1, 12–14, 28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2,
2009) (denying motion to dismiss claim that patents on genetic sequences are
unconstitutional).
59. See Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell & Michael J.
Meurer in Support of Respondent at 31, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (Oct. 2,
2009).
60. See Brief of Regulatory DataCorp et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 28–29, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Aug. 6, 2009) (arguing that
“innovations in business, finance, and other applied economic fields plainly
qualify as ‘technological’” under a definition that stresses “‘the practical
application of knowledge in a particular area’”) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2348 (1963)); see also W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE
OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 56 (2009) (though not
offering an opinion on the patentable subject matter debate, suggesting that in
a sense even works of art can be viewed as technological insofar as they
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critiques depend on dictionary definitions of technology,
however, I find them less than persuasive; legal terms often,
and unremarkably, depart from standard everyday usage. I do
concede, however, that if the “forces of nature” include the
“laws” of economics, psychology, and other social scientific
disciplines—a proposition which I am inclined to accept,
assuming that the purported laws are sufficiently predictable,
etc., in their application—the universe of “technology” will be
correspondingly expansive. Coming at the issue from the other
side, some critics may argue that because my proposed
technological arts requirement only requires that the invention
use technology it will include too much. Alternative definitions
of technological arts might require that the invention perform a
technological function, or pertain to a technological field, or (yet
more difficult to satisfy) contribute a technical solution to a
technical problem.61 These more rigorous definitions of
technological arts presumably would exclude many sports
moves (as well as the infamous patent for a method of
exercising a cat by means of a laser pointer62), whereas it’s not
clear that mine would.
Similar critiques might be raised with respect to my
physicality and noninvasiveness criteria. As noted above, in
order to implement a version of the mental steps doctrine the
physicality screen would require application of a “point of
novelty” test that, in many other patent contexts,63 is
disfavored and is (in any event) inelegant.64 To some, the
noninvasiveness criterion might seem vague and, like the

stimulate human emotions in an intentional manner). The Regulatory
DataCorp brief also notes that, in U.S. practice, games have been considered
patentable subject matter for many decades. See id. at 29. Are games
technological under my definition, simply because they make use of physical
artifacts and are human creations?
61. See Cotter, supra note 2, at 888–89 (noting this approach in EPO case
law); Willoughby, supra note 35, at 135 (concluding, after surveying the
technological arts doctrines in different European nations, that there is “a
good deal” of variation).
62. See U.S. Patent No. 6,701,872 (filed Oct. 30, 2002).
63. Point of novelty appears to retain vitality in connection with the
printed matter doctrine, however. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). In the amicus brief he filed in Bilski, Collins argues that printed
matter and mental steps are two sides of the same coin. See Collins Amicus
Brief, supra note 44, at 22.
64. On the inelegance point, see Cotter, supra note 2, at 887 n.162.
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disfavored “moral utility” doctrine,65 to tax the USPTO’s
institutional competence.
My response to all of these possible critiques, however, is
as before twofold. First, because traditional patent eligibility
standards (as I view them) implicate longstanding intuitions
that the patent system should not impinge upon certain of
realms—natural laws, human liberty and autonomy interests,
and the domain of copyright—patent examiners, courts, and
other policymakers will necessarily need to exercise judgment
in evaluating cases near the boundary. If the interests served
by these doctrines are as important as I perceive them to be,
they are worth preserving even when doing so might appear to
tax institutional capabilities. Second, however, because these
interests can be preserved by relatively narrow limits on the
scope of patentable subject matter, broader exclusions are in
my view less clearly defensible. In particular, broad exclusions
from patent eligibility that depend on cost/benefit estimates
that may change over time may be less desirable than more
finely honed approaches to what may prove to be temporary
problems. For better or worse, my proposed framework seeks to
preserve the wisdom of the older doctrines while retaining the
patent system’s flexibility to adapt to new technologies.
Properly modified, patent eligibility doctrine can serve as a
useful—but modest—tool for achieving important—but
nevertheless limited—human purposes.

65. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting application of the “moral utility” doctrine to
preclude the patenting of immoral or fraudulent inventions).

